assay

<p align="center"> <h1 align="center">Assay</h1> <p align="center"> <strong>The open, recomputable evidence profile for privileged MCP tool actions.</strong><br /> <span>Assay records what a privileged tool call decided, what was observed, and what stays unproven, so a reviewer can replay the claim offline instead of trusting the agent's account of itself. Enforcement is deterministic and fail-closed, and the enforcing proxy is the reference producer rather than the contract itself. Kernel-level (eBPF/LSM) observation on Linux is an optional stronger vantage. CI-native, no backend, bounded by design.</span> </p> <p align="center"> <a href="https://crates.io/crates/assay-cli"><img src="https://img.shields.io/crates/v/assay-cli.svg" alt="Crates.io"></a> <a href="https://github.com/Rul1an/assay/actions/workflows/ci.yml"><img src="https://github.com/Rul1an/assay/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg" alt="CI"></a> <a href="https://github.com/Rul1an/assay/blob/main/LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/crates/l/assay-core.svg" alt="License"></a> </p> <p align="center"> <a href="#quickstart">Quickstart</a> · <a href="#enforce-prove-stay-honest">How it works</a> · <a href="#see-it-work">See it work</a> · <a href="examples/mcp-quickstart/">MCP example</a> · <a href="docs/security/OWASP-MCP-TOP10-MAPPING.md">OWASP MCP Top 10</a> · <a href="https://github.com/Rul1an/assay/discussions">Discussions</a> </p> </p>

---

Agents got real tool access through MCP — and tool poisoning, rug pulls, and confused-deputy OAuth came with it. Most tools scan a server or filter a prompt. Assay sits at the tool-call boundary and does three things, in order.

One golden path: the release-pinned agent journey records the nine driven CLI/MCP steps and their exit/stdout contracts. Its protected-action fixture lives in examples/privileged-action-gate/.

Enforce, prove, stay honest

• Enforce. A deterministic, fail-closed gate decides every tools/call before it runs, with the precise reason for each allow or deny. On Linux it adds real kernel enforcement — an eBPF/LSM IPv4/TCP connect-egress block and a Landlock TCP-connect port allowlist, both opt-in and fail-closed. A policy it cannot express exactly is refused, never half-applied.
• Prove. Each decision and observed effect becomes an offline-verifiable, tamper-evident evidence bundle: the verdict, the pre-call establish journey, and declared-vs-observed conformance — all reviewable in CI, with no hosted backend.
• Stay honest. Every claim carries its basis (verified, self_reported, inferred, absent), and a gate refuses to let a claim exceed what was observed. A tool returning "success" is the provider's assertion, never proof. Assay ships no single safety score and never claims more than it can prove.

Quickstart

# Fast path: release installer for Linux and macOS.
curl -fsSL https://getassay.dev/install.sh | sh

# Confirm the command resolves; if setup fails, run `assay doctor`.
assay --version

# Source-build alternative (requires Rust):
cargo install assay-cli --version 6.0.0 --locked

python3 examples/mcp-quickstart/run.py

For v6.0.0, run the last command from a source checkout or an extracted published CLI archive. The installer is binary-only and does not carry the bounded quickstart assets. The live getassay.dev installer verifies the selected archive against its published SHA-256 sidecar before extraction. Set ASSAY_REQUIRE_PROVENANCE=1 to additionally require GitHub artifact provenance; the default reports provenance_not_requested and strict success reports provenance_verified. A checksum proves byte equality with the published sidecar, not producer identity. Provenance identifies the source and build, not runtime safety or semantic correctness.

Captured runner output (the bundled local mock performs no external action):

assay quickstart: PASS
mcp_requests=initialize,tools/list,tools/call
decision=allow tool=read_file
decision_artifact=.assay/quickstart/decisions.ndjson
non_claim=forwarded_to_local_mock_only

Released surfaces:

• Static project manifests are shipped for Claude Code and Cursor; Codex uses the equivalent TOML entry documented in the editor MCP recipe. Manifest presence is not host-discovery proof. assay mcp config-path supports Claude and Cursor only.
• Published v6.0.0 CLI archives cover Linux x86_64/arm64, macOS x86_64/arm64, and Windows x86_64. The Python wheels cover CPython 3.12 on macOS x86_64/arm64 and Linux x86_64; other interpreters and platforms are not claimed.
• Published assay-mcp-server archives cover Linux x86_64/arm64. MCPB and server.json package descriptors are also published; their presence is not host-discovery proof.
• CI: GitHub Action. Core flows need no hosted backend or API key. New to the threat model? The OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping states, per risk, what Assay covers and deliberately does not.

What ships

| Output | What it is | |--------|------------| | Policy gate | assay mcp wrap — deterministic allow/deny before tools run, with the reason. | | Evidence bundle | Offline-verifiable, tamper-evident archive for audit and replay. | | Trust Basis / Trust Card | Canonical trust-basis.json (bounded claim classification) plus review-friendly trustcard.{json,md,html}. | | External receipts | Eval outcomes, runtime decisions, and model inventory as bounded receipts with JSON Schema contracts. | | Tool-decision surface | Each privileged tools/call recorded as assay.tool_decision_surface.v0 — sensitive ids hashed, raw arguments never stored. | | SARIF / CI | GitHub Action, Security-tab integration, policy gates on PRs. | | Attestation | Export a bundle as an in-toto / DSSE statement (v0), anchor-pluggable. |

  Agent ──► Assay ──► MCP Server
              ├─ ✅ ALLOW / ❌ DENY  (policy, with reason)
              ├─► 📋 Evidence bundle (offline-verifiable)
              └─► 📊 Trust Basis → Trust Card → SARIF / CI

Current release: v6.0.0. CHANGELOG.md and release notes remain the authority for released behavior; merged changes after the tag are Unreleased, and crates.io publication is separate from merge state.

Is this for me?

Yes if you already have eval output, runtime decisions, inventory artifacts, or MCP tool-call tests, and you want a small reviewable CI artifact instead of a dashboard — bounded auditability, not a scalar trust badge.

Not yet if you need Assay to judge model correctness for you, want a hosted dashboard as the product, or want a compliance claim rather than a bounded evidence boundary. Assay is not a trust-score engine, a generic eval dashboard, or a hosted observability product — see what it is and is not.

See it work

An agent tries a privileged action — github.add_deploy_key — through the enforcing proxy, decided per call before it forwards, offline against a local mock (no real credentials):

cd examples/privileged-action-gate && ./run.sh

A deny is fail-closed caution, not a verdict on intent; an allow is the decision to forward, never proof the action happened. Declared-vs-observed conformance is recorded beside the verdict, never as a gate. Full walkthrough: privileged-action-gate.

Pick your path

| You have | What you get | Start here | |---|---|---| | Promptfoo JSONL from CI evals | Eval outcome receipts + verified bundle + Trust Basis diff | Promptfoo JSONL | | OpenFeature EvaluationDetails | Decision receipt + verified bundle | OpenFeature | | CycloneDX ML-BOM model component | Inventory receipt + verified bundle | CycloneDX ML-BOM | | MCP tool calls | Allow/deny audit trail + observed-behavior evidence | MCP Quick Start | | A GitHub PR gate | Trust Basis diff, gate status, SARIF/JUnit-ready output | CI Guide | | A Runner archive / coverage annotation | Coverage descriptors + claim-class cells + a claimed-vs-observed check | Coverage-honesty walkthrough |

The workflow stays small: import or record a bounded outcome, bundle and verify it, compile trust-basis.json, gate the Trust Basis diff. Assay doesn't make the upstream tool the source of truth; it makes the evidence boundary inspectable. For privileged tool actions, the MCP proxy records each tools/call as a structured tool-decision surface — keeping the asserted-versus-verified line honest.

Policy is simple

version: "2.0"
name: "my-policy"
tools:
  allow: ["read_file", "list_dir"]
  deny: ["exec", "shell", "write_file"]
schemas:
  read_file:
    type: object
    properties:
      path: { type: string, pattern: "^/app/.*" }
    required: ["path"]

assay init --from-trace trace.jsonl generates the runtime-observation policy used by the trace-generation flow (files, network, and processes); it is not an MCP authorization policy. Migrate a legacy MCP constraints: policy with assay policy migrate. See Policy Files.

Why Assay

| | | |---|---| | Canonical evidence | Assay's evidence model is the stable contract; OpenTelemetry and protocol adapters (ACP / A2A / UCP) map into it. | | Deterministic | Same input, same decision — not probabilistic. | | Bounded claims | Explicit about verified vs visible vs absent — no score-first UX. | | Offline-first | No backend required for core enforcement and bundle verification. | | Checkable provenance | Which piece of the source-class and coverage model shipped when, as commits you can git log rather than claims you have to take — provenance, prior art credited first. |

Learn more

• MCP Quickstart · Editor MCP recipe — policy-enforcing MCP in Cursor / Claude Code / Codex
• MCP 2025/2026 protocol-era parity — pinned resultType and interim-result compatibility corpus
• Coding-agent governance · OpenTelemetry & Langfuse — observed runs → evidence
• Evidence Receipts in Action — Promptfoo / OpenFeature / CycloneDX receipt families
• CI Guide · Evidence Store (S3 / B2 / MinIO)
• OWASP MCP Top 10 mapping · Security experiments
• Positioning: ADR-033 · RFC-005

<details> <summary>Evidence epistemology, latency, and the internal Runner</summary>

Trust claims use explicit epistemology, not a single safety score: verified (direct evidence or offline verification), self_reported (emitted without independent corroboration), inferred (bounded, documented rules), absent (no trustworthy evidence). Assay ships no aggr