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18-ot-ics-security

Operational Technology and industrial control system security — Purdue

Install / Use

npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 18-ot-ics-security

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

85/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Claude Code
Zed

Our assessment of 18-ot-ics-security

18-ot-ics-security scores 85/100 on our quality scale, 823rd of 1,094 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 8.3 KB long, well organised into 26 sections with 3 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

It has 441 GitHub stars, a meaningful sign that others use it.

Substance
29/30
Structure
18/20
Description
12/15
Adoption
11/20
Freshness
15/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so 18-ot-ics-security is actively maintained.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-05 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 100/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-07. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-07. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

18-ot-ics-security compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than 18-ot-ics-security; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
18-ot-ics-security (this skill)by Masriyan854412mo agoSKILL.md
Agent-Reachby Panniantong100112.8k10d agoCLAUDE.md
headroomby headroomlabs-ai10079.9ktodayCLAUDE.md
Scraplingby D4Vinci100104.0ktodayMCP Server
crawl4aiby unclecode10087.5ktodayMCP Server

Frequently asked questions

How do I install 18-ot-ics-security?
Run npx skills add Masriyan/Claude-Code-CyberSecurity-Skill --skill 18-ot-ics-security. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does 18-ot-ics-security work with?
It is written for Claude Code and Zed, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is 18-ot-ics-security safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 100/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is 18-ot-ics-security still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 2 months ago, so 18-ot-ics-security is actively maintained.

name: OT / ICS / SCADA Security description: Operational Technology and industrial control system security — Purdue model segmentation, industrial protocol analysis (Modbus, DNP3, S7, EtherNet/IP), PLC/HMI exposure, IEC 62443 alignment, and MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, for authorized and safety-conscious assessments version: 3.1.0 author: Masriyan tags: [cybersecurity, ot-security, ics, scada, modbus, dnp3, plc, iec62443, attack-ics, purdue-model]

OT / ICS / SCADA Security

Purpose

Enable Claude to assess Operational Technology (OT) and Industrial Control System (ICS) environments — PLCs, RTUs, HMIs, SCADA servers, historians, and field devices — with safety as the first constraint. Claude reasons about the Purdue/ISA-95 model, analyzes industrial protocols passively, maps adversary behavior to MITRE ATT&CK for ICS, and aligns recommendations to IEC 62443 and the NIST SP 800-82 guidance.

SAFETY & AUTHORIZATION — READ FIRST: OT systems control physical processes; a crashed PLC can mean equipment damage, environmental release, or loss of life. Default to passive, non-intrusive methods. Never send active scans, writes, or protocol fuzzing to production OT without written authorization, asset-owner sign-off, and a tested rollback/safety plan — ideally on a test bench or during a maintenance window. Confirm scope and the "do-no-harm" boundary before proceeding.


Activation Triggers

This skill activates when the user asks about:

  • ICS / SCADA / OT / DCS security or industrial network assessment
  • Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, EtherNet/IP, BACnet, OPC-UA, IEC 61850/104 protocols
  • PLC, RTU, HMI, historian, or engineering-workstation security
  • Purdue model / ISA-95 segmentation and IT/OT boundary review
  • IEC 62443, NIST SP 800-82, or NERC CIP alignment
  • MITRE ATT&CK for ICS technique mapping
  • Internet-exposed ICS devices (Shodan/Censys dorks) or ICS asset inventory
  • OT threat detection, anomaly monitoring, or ICS incident response

Prerequisites

pip install requests pyyaml
# Protocol libraries (lab use): pip install pymodbus scapy

Optional enhanced capabilities:

  • Wireshark / tshark with ICS dissectors (Modbus, DNP3, S7, ENIP, GOOSE)
  • nmap ICS NSE scripts (use read-only scripts only, with care)
  • GRASSMARLIN / passive asset-discovery tooling
  • Shodan/Censys access for exposure checks (passive, external)

Core Capabilities

1. Architecture & Purdue Model Review

When asked to review OT architecture, map assets to Purdue levels and assess the boundaries:

| Level | Zone | Assets | Key control | |-------|------|--------|-------------| | 4–5 | Enterprise / IT | ERP, business network, internet | Should never directly reach L0–L2 | | 3.5 | IDMZ | Jump hosts, patch/AV relays, historian replica | Brokered, inspected IT↔OT traffic only | | 3 | Operations | SCADA servers, historians, engineering WS | Hardened, monitored | | 2 | Supervisory | HMIs, control servers | | | 1 | Control | PLCs, RTUs, IEDs | | | 0 | Process | Sensors, actuators, drives | |

Flag: missing IDMZ, flat IT/OT networks, dual-homed engineering workstations, remote vendor access bypassing the DMZ, and any direct path from L4/L5 to L0–L2.

2. Industrial Protocol Analysis (Passive-First)

Prefer reading a SPAN/TAP capture over active probing. From a PCAP, identify:

  • Modbus/TCP (502) — function codes; flag writes (FC 5/6/15/16), unauthenticated reads, exposure beyond the cell.
  • DNP3 (20000) — operate/direct-operate, lack of Secure Authentication (SAv5).
  • S7comm / S7comm-plus (102) — PLC start/stop, program upload/download.
  • EtherNet/IP + CIP (44818/2222) — forward-open, attribute writes.
  • OPC-UA (4840) — security policy None, anonymous sessions.
  • IEC 61850 GOOSE/MMS, IEC 60870-5-104 (2404), BACnet (47808) as present.

Note that most ICS protocols have no authentication or encryption by design — any reachable client can issue commands. Use scripts/ics_protocol_analyzer.py to summarize an exported PCAP and flag write/control operations and unexpected talkers.

3. Exposure & Asset Discovery

  • Passive inventory from captures (MAC/OUI → vendor, protocol → device role).
  • External exposure (read-only, external) via Shodan/Censys dorks — never expose live device details publicly:
    • port:502 product:Modbus, port:20000 source address, tag:ics, "Siemens, SIMATIC", port:47808, "Schneider Electric".
  • For any device that must be reachable, document why, the compensating controls, and whether it should be behind the IDMZ instead.
  • Active scanning, if authorized: use only read-only nmap NSE (modbus-discover, s7-info, bacnet-info, enip-info) with low rate, never against safety-instrumented systems (SIS).

4. Threat Modeling — MITRE ATT&CK for ICS

Map plausible adversary paths using the ICS matrix tactics: Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Evasion → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → Command-and-Control → Inhibit Response Function → Impair Process Control → Impact. Reference high-signal techniques (e.g., T0883 Internet-Accessible Device, T0836 Modify Parameter, T0831 Manipulation of Control, T0814 Denial of Service, T0816 Device Restart/Shutdown). Anchor scenarios to real tradecraft (Stuxnet, TRITON/TRISIS targeting SIS, Industroyer/CRASHOVERRIDE, PIPEDREAM/INCONTROLLER).

5. IEC 62443 / NIST SP 800-82 Alignment

  • Define zones and conduits; assign Security Levels (SL 1–4) per zone based on threat.
  • Review against IEC 62443-3-3 system requirements (FR1 IAC, FR2 UC, FR3 system integrity, FR4 data confidentiality, FR5 restricted data flow, FR6 timely response, FR7 resource availability).
  • Map to NIST SP 800-82r3 control overlays and NERC CIP where the asset owner is in scope (BES).

6. OT-Aware Detection & Incident Response

  • Detection: baseline normal protocol talkers and command rates; alert on unexpected write/program-download, new engineering connections, off-hours commands, and L4→L1 traffic.
  • IR (coordinate with → Skill 07, but OT-modified): safety and process continuity outrank evidence preservation; involve process/safety engineers; prefer passive collection; have a manual-operations fallback before isolating anything.

Output Standards

# OT/ICS Security Assessment — [Site / System]
Date: [Date] | Scope: [Zones/Assets] | Method: [Passive/Active] | Analyst: [Name]
Safety constraints honored: [yes — passive only / window used / etc.]

## Executive Summary
[Posture, top safety-relevant risks]

## Purdue / Zone-Conduit Map
[Levels, boundaries, IDMZ status]

## Findings
### [O-01] Modbus writes reachable from IT VLAN  (Critical)
- ATT&CK ICS: T0883, T0836 | IEC 62443 FR5
- Evidence: [pcap flow IT-host → PLC FC16]
- Process impact: [what physical effect is possible]
- Remediation: [conduit/firewall rule, IDMZ broker, read-only segmentation]

## IEC 62443 Zone/SL Recommendations
| Zone | Current SL | Target SL | Gap |

## Prioritized Remediation (safety-weighted)

Script Reference

ics_protocol_analyzer.py

# Summarize an exported PCAP CSV/JSON (from tshark) and flag control/write ops
tshark -r capture.pcap -T json > capture.json
python scripts/ics_protocol_analyzer.py --input capture.json --output ics_report.json

# Generate Shodan/Censys exposure dorks for a vendor/protocol set
python scripts/ics_protocol_analyzer.py --dorks --vendor siemens --output dorks.txt

Skill Integration

| Next Step | Condition | Target Skill | |-----------|-----------|--------------| | Deep PCAP / IDS rules | Network capture available | → Skill 08 | | Firmware / device RE | PLC/RTU firmware obtained | → Skill 04 | | OT incident handling | Active incident | → Skill 07 | | Detection content | SIEM/OT-monitoring rules needed | → Skill 12 | | IT-side segmentation hardening | IT/OT boundary hosts | → Skill 15 |


References

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars441
CategorySecurity
Updated2mo ago
Forks82

Languages

Python

Trust signals

100/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

No cautions