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systems-manager

System-Manager will update your system and install/upgrade applications. Supports Agentic AI through MCP Server

Install / Use

claude mcp add Knuckles-Team -- npx -y github:Knuckles-Team/systems-manager

If the server publishes to npm under a different name, use that package instead — check the repo README.

About this skill
🔌

MCP Server

Model Context Protocol server

Quality Score

80/100

Supported Platforms

Claude Code
Claude Desktop

systems-manager

Version: 2.1.0

systems-manager is the typed host-operations provider for Agent Utilities and GraphOS. It exposes cross-platform package, service, process, network, disk, managed-file, firewall, physical-storage, Agent OS, and privacy-safe host-ingestion capabilities without exposing a raw command tool.

The current package requires Python 3.11–3.14 and agent-utilities>=2.0.0,<3.0.0.

Install and run

Install only the interface you need:

pip install "systems-manager[mcp]"
systems-manager-mcp --transport stdio

The optional extras are:

| Extra | Capability | | --- | --- | | mcp | FastMCP provider runtime | | agent | Agent server and Logfire integration | | all | MCP plus agent runtime | | test | Test dependencies |

For an ephemeral MCP launch:

uvx --from "systems-manager[mcp]" systems-manager-mcp --transport stdio

The checked-in mcp_config.json is a reference-only client catalog. It contains env:// references and safe deny defaults, never deployment endpoints, credentials, certificate paths, filesystem paths, hostnames, or identities. Project-specific values belong in AgentConfig or the process launcher.

Security contract

  • Network MCP listeners require configured authentication. Non-loopback listeners also require direct TLS or a trusted TLS-terminating proxy, exact allowed hosts, and the current Agent Utilities transport checks.
  • Host mutations are denied unless SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ALLOW_HOST_MUTATIONS=true and the individual request receives destructive-operation approval.
  • Managed-file writes additionally require SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ALLOW_FILESYSTEM_MUTATIONS=true.
  • Sensitive reads and active probes have independent default-deny gates.
  • Managed paths are confined beneath an explicit SYSTEMS_MANAGER_FILESYSTEM_ROOT; there is no working-directory fallback.
  • Raw shell, arbitrary commands, plaintext credentials, model-authored cron creation, and compatibility command aliases are not capabilities.
  • Logs and observability are metadata-only. Keep LANGFUSE_CAPTURE_CONTENT=false.

AgentConfig, secrets, and TLS

Use TLS_PROFILE / TLS_PROFILE_REF with TLS_PROFILES_REF for shared verified outbound trust. Service-specific profiles such as OIDC_TLS_PROFILE_REF, MODEL_TLS_PROFILE_REF, and LANGFUSE_TLS_PROFILE_REF may select entries from the same runtime catalog. Do not hardcode CA paths or verification flags in application code, and do not disable verification for incomplete certificate chains.

Out-of-band BMC health reads consume one runtime secret projection from SYSTEMS_MANAGER_BMC_CREDENTIALS. AgentConfig resolves the checked env:// or secret reference before launch; the provider accepts exactly a JSON object with host, user, and password. No secret-store vendor, secret path, token, or credential value is embedded in this package.

The MCP listener's own certificate or trusted-proxy boundary uses the current Agent Utilities MCP_TLS_* configuration. The optional agent listener uses SERVER_TLS_* and requires JWT configuration for non-loopback serving.

MCP tools

The default MCP_TOOL_MODE=intent exposes the small intent-verb surface. Backing action-routed tools stay available for governed discovery and on-demand loading. Tool and tag filters can further reduce the visible surface.

Auto-generated from the live MCP server; do not edit between the markers.

<!-- MCP-TOOLS-TABLE:START -->

Condensed action-routed tools (MCP_TOOL_MODE=condensed)

| MCP Tool | Toggle Env Var | Description | |----------|----------------|-------------| | capture_system_snapshot | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Takes a point-in-time snapshot of the system state (CPU, RAM, Processes). | | get_management_capabilities | — | | | get_network_connections | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Maps active TCP/UDP endpoints directly to owning processes. | | get_process_details | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Retrieves deep cross-platform process details (threads, modules, memory). | | health_check | — | | | list_kernel_modules | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | List loaded drivers/modules (lsmod or driverquery). | | list_services | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Cross-platform service enumeration (systemctl or Get-Service). | | manage_service | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Start/Stop/Restart/Enable/Disable services cross-platform. | | query_system_logs | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Cross-platform log querying (journalctl or Get-WinEvent). | | sm_advanced_operations | — | Operations for SSH and specialized managers | | sm_agent_identity_operations | IDENTITYTOOL | Issues or verifies privacy-preserving agent identities. | | sm_agent_scheduler_operations | AGENT_HEALTHTOOL | Manages the cognitive scheduler: get stats, list processes, preempt, or reset quota. | | sm_agent_specialist_operations | SPECIALIST_REGISTRYTOOL | Manages specialist packages: install, uninstall, list, or search. | | sm_agent_watchdog_operations | WATCHDOGTOOL | Manages file watchdog triggers: check file change, list active watchers, or drain triggers. | | sm_cron_operations | — | Operations for cron jobs | | sm_disk_operations | — | Operations for managing system disks | | sm_file_operations | — | Operations for file and log management | | sm_firewall_operations | — | Operations for firewall management | | sm_network_operations | — | Operations for network analysis | | sm_process_operations | — | Operations for managing system processes | | sm_service_operations | — | Operations for managing system services | | sm_storage_health | STORAGE_HEALTHTOOL | Physical disk + BMC drive-fault health: SMART (incl. megaraid passthrough), | | sm_system_operations | — | System operations for managing packages, system health, and updates | | sm_user_operations | — | Operations for user and group management | | start_system_trace | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Start a kernel-level event trace (ETW on Windows, or strace on Linux). | | stop_system_trace | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | Stop a kernel-level event trace. | | systems_ingest_host | — | Ingest a keyed host telemetry projection through the governed ChangeEnvelope boundary as typed HardwareNode, NetworkInterface, and DiskVolume nodes. |

27 action-routed tool(s) · 0 verbose 1:1 tool(s). Each is enabled unless its <DOMAIN>TOOL toggle is set false; MCP_TOOL_MODE selects the surface (intent default — the six verb-tools, granular set loaded on demand · condensed action-routed · verbose 1:1 · both). Auto-generated — do not edit.

<!-- MCP-TOOLS-TABLE:END -->

Typical backing domains include OS/package lifecycle, services, processes, networks, disks, managed files, cron removal, structured firewall rules, storage/BMC diagnostics, Agent OS administration, and governed host telemetry ingestion. Discover an action schema before calling it; unavailable operations must not be emulated with another tool.

Knowledge-graph ingestion

systems_ingest_host reads local typed telemetry and submits an allowlisted projection through the Agent Utilities native governed ingestion boundary. It emits only:

  • HardwareNode, NetworkInterface, and DiskVolume nodes;
  • hasInterface and hasVolume relationships;
  • HMAC-SHA-256 opaque identifiers derived with the deployment-owned SYSTEMS_MANAGER_PSEUDONYMIZATION_KEY.

Hostnames, network addresses, hardware addresses, usernames, local paths, credentials, and arbitrary extra fields are rejected or excluded. Missing graph authority, invalid content, and unavailable ingestion fail explicitly; they are not silent no-ops.

GraphOS delegation

Host operations execute inside the service's local operating-system boundary. For fleet work, GraphOS delegates to an authenticated systems-manager service on the target boundary. Inventory, endpoints, credentials, TLS profiles, and target aliases remain external deployment configuration. Persist only opaque, non-personal references.

The bundled systems-manager-operations skill covers every current provider workflow. Older BMC command and NIC-bond script skills were consolidated because those raw-script surfaces are not part of the typed current contract.

Agent server

Install the agent extra and launch:

pip install "systems-manager[agent]"
systems-manager-agent --help

Workspace, MCP catalog, and custom-skill paths are accepted only when explicitly configured and present. There is no packaged-config or current-directory fallback. A non-loopback listener requires an explicit allow gate, direct or trusted-proxy TLS, JWT issuer/JWKS/audience configuration, and debug mode disabled.

Environment variables

The generated table is sourced from the value-free .env.example plus the inherited Agent Utilities contract.

<!-- ENV-VARS-TABLE:START -->

Package environment variables

| Variable | Example | Description | |----------|---------|-------------| | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_FILESYSTEM_ROOT | — | Required managed filesystem boundary | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_TEMP_ROOT | — | Optional cleanup root beneath the managed boundary | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_PSEUDONYMIZATION_KEY | secret-injected | Deployment-owned secret, at least 32 bytes | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_BMC_CREDENTIALS | — | Secret-projected JSON with host/user/password | | TLS_PROFILE | — | Shared mandatory-verification transport profile | | TLS_PROFILES_REF | — | Runtime reference to the transport profile catalog | | LANGFUSE_TLS_PROFILE_REF | — | Runtime reference to verified Langfuse trust | | MCP_TOOL_MODE | intent | Current intent-first tool surface | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ALLOW_HOST_MUTATIONS | false | Default-deny host mutations | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ALLOW_FILESYSTEM_MUTATIONS | false | Default-deny file mutations | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ALLOW_SENSITIVE_READS | false | Default-deny sensitive inventory | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ALLOW_NETWORK_PROBES | false | Default-deny active probes | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_MAX_BLOCKING_OPERATIONS | 2 | Bounded host-operation concurrency | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_HEALTH_INGEST | true | Enable governed health trend ingestion | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_HEALTH_AGGREGATE_S | 3600 | Health trend aggregation window | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_NODE_REF | — | Runtime node alias; only a keyed digest persists | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_NODE_REFS | — | Runtime aliases for governed derivation | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_NOTIFY_URL | — | Optional credential-free HTTPS notification target | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_REPOSITORY_ALLOWLIST_JSON | [] | Approved credential-free repositories | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_LOCAL_PACKAGE_SHA256_MAP | {} | Approved package paths and digests | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_SECONDS | 120 | Default command timeout | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_ENV_METADATA_ALLOWLIST | — | Non-sensitive environment names readable as metadata | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_UV_VERSION | — | Exact approved uv release | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_NVM_COMMIT | — | Exact approved NVM commit | | SYSTEMS_MANAGER_NVM_DIR | — | NVM directory beneath the managed filesystem root | | ALLOW_UPDATE_ON_K8S | false | Keep Kubernetes lifecycle guard enabled | | MISCTOOL | true | Register base health/readiness tools | | OS_PROVIDERTOOL | true | Register operating-system provider tools | | STORAGE_HEALTHTOOL | true | Register storage health tools | | AGENT_HEALTHTOOL | true | Register agent health tools | | IDENTITYTOOL | true | Register identity tools | | SPECIALIST_REGISTRYTOOL | true | Register specialist registry tools | | WATCHDOGTOOL | true | Register filesystem watchdog tools | | MAX_CONCURRENT_AGENTS | 5 | Agent scheduler limit | | AGENT_POLICIES_PATH | — | Runtime policy location | | PERMISSIONS_SIGNING_KEY | secret-injected | Runtime secret projection for identity signing | | SPECIALIST_REGISTRY_PATH | — | Runtime specialist registry location | | MCP_CONFIG_PATH | — | Runtime MCP catalog location | | PROJECT_ROOT | — | Runtime automation boundary | | WORKSPACE_PATH | — | Explicit agent workspace directory

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

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GitHub Stars3
CategoryCustomer
Updated1d ago
Forks1

Languages

Python

Security Score

92/100

Audited on Aug 18, 2026

1 low