HiddenVM

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<a href="#About"><img src="./misc/hiddenvm-logo-full.svg" width="100%" height="184pt"></a>
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<a href="#About"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/incognitoiceman/HiddenVM.svg?color=%2344cc11ff&label=version" /></a>&nbsp; 
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<a href="#About"><img src="https://img.shields.io/github/downloads/incognitoiceman/HiddenVM/total?color=%236b2981" /></a>&nbsp; 
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<h2><a href="#About">HiddenVM</a></h2>

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Warning

This software is in the alpha stage of development.

The work on this project is 90% complete as it is only missing a way to properly connect Whonix to the clearnet.

This software is specifically meant to run Whonix on Tails OS but it can run other operating systems.

At this stage the hypervisor connects to the clearnet internet infrastructure (usermode networking) on Tails which connects to the internet without connecting to Tor which means any installed like Windows, Ubuntu and Mac will connect to the internet the same way you connect a VM to the internet from Ubuntu or Windows but the difference is the operating system is run as a persistent VM on Tails. I have even run Tails as a VM on the Tails host OS which successfully connected to the clearnet internet.

This project is specifically designed to run Whonix but can run other operating systems.

Our issue is that the capabilities of virt-manager become very limited when connected to clearnet usermode networking (qemu:///session). The Virtual Machines are perfectly able to connect to the internet using usermode networking but the Whonix gateway needs to connects to a NAT virtual bridge which is required to connect the VM to the internet. On the other hand qemu:///system which is run as root libvirtd (daemon) can create and connect to the NAT virtual bridge as it has root permissions but unfortunately the qemu:///system connection connects to the tor infrastructure and iptables blocks the connection.

What we are looking for is a way for the Whonix-Gateway to create and connect to clearnet using the NAT virtual bridge without any issues.

Once basic functionality has been successfully implemented we will look forward to other functionality.

Any help in the form of pull requests or issues to enable Whonix to connect to clearnet with a NAT virtual bridge from libvirt is greatly appreciated.

About

HiddenVM is a futuristic tool powered by KVM designed to combine the powerful amnesic nature of Tails and the impenetrable design of Whonix with the unbreakable strength of Veracrypt.

This software has been forked from a project of the same name by the author aforensics HiddenVM <https://github.com/aforensics/HiddenVM>_.

Anyone is free to modify and re-use this software for non-commercial usage.

This version of HiddenVM is powered by KVM unlike the previous version which was powered by VirtualBox which is considered by many to be insecure.

It is designed to be a one click free and open source Linux application that allows you to run Red Hat's open-source Virtual Machine Manager <https://virt-manager.org>_ on the Tails operating system <https://tails.boum.org>_.

The libvirt daemon will connect to the clearnet infrastructure by default without modifying any setting of the Tor connection in Tails OS.

The persistent nature of HiddenVM allows you to save all your data inside a hidden VeraCrypt volume <https://www.veracrypt.fr/en/Hidden%20Volume.html>_ without losing any data.

The benefit of using a hidden Veracrypt volume is that any adversaries will be unable to tell if there is a hidden volume present because the data present on the drive would look like random data. Thus giving you the benefit of plausible deniability.

If set up correctly all an adversary can see is an empty Tails USB drive and a hard drive full of meaningless data.

Installation and usage

Before you install:

• Always have two Tails USB sticks, with one as a backup of the latest working Tails for your current HiddenVM.

• Always upgrade Tails on your second stick, in case the new Tails doesn't work with your current HiddenVM.

• Always give us time to troubleshoot and fix our code to make it work with a new Tails version. Thank you for your patience.

• This will give you stability and prevent you from being locked out of your HiddenVM at any point due to a Tails upgrade.

Install:

• Boot into Tails <https://tails.boum.org>_ on your computer and set an admin password <https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/startup_options/administration_password/index.en.html>_ for your session.

• Do NOT use <#why-shouldnt-i-use-tails-official-persistent-volume-feature>_ Tails' persistent volume feature <https://tails.boum.org/doc/first_steps/persistence/index.en.html>_.

• Create and mount a deniable, secure storage environment on internal or external media such as a VeraCrypt <https://veracrypt.fr/en>_ volume.

• Download our latest release ZIP <https://github.com/IncognitoIceman/HiddenVM/releases>_ and extract the archive.

• Run our AppImage file in the Files browser.

• Choose to store HiddenVM in your secure storage and it will download all binaries to launch Virtual Machine Manager.

Usage:

• After initially installing HiddenVM you can use it offline where each Virtual Machine Manager launch takes about 5 minutes.

How can I trust the HiddenVM AppImage file?

You don't have to. Inspect the code yourself it is open source:

• Open a Terminal and cd to the folder containing our AppImage.

• Extract the appimage using the commmand: ./AppImageName.AppImage --appimage-extract.

• The AppImage will be extracted to a folder called squashfs-root.

• I recommend downloading the linux version of Visual Studio Code as a .deb file to view the entire source code. The debian package can be installed using the command sudo dpkg -i code*.deb.

FAQs / Warnings

What type of person might use HiddenVM? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

In the same way as Tor and Tails, HiddenVM (called HVM for short) is intended for a wide range of people facing different threats around the world. This software is specifically designed to be used by Privacy Activists, Whistleblowers and people living in countries controlled by an authoritarian government regardless anyone is free to use the software.

What is the motivation behind the development of this project? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ After the leaking of Top Secret and highly classified information by Edward Snowden <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden>_, I was struck by the extent of surveillance of foreign citizens by the US government including it's own. In the classified documents the US government used the 9/11 attacks as a pretext to spy on the whole world. There are countless Ed Snowdens in a lot of authoritarian countries. I am a strong advocate for freedom of speech and human rights.

To make sure were all in the same bus, I want to point out what happened to a Sheikh called Nimr al-Nimr <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nimr_al-Nimr>_ in Saudi Arabia who was executed for simply speaking out and calling for non-violent protests against the Saudi government and what happened to a journalist called Jamal Khashoggi <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jamal_Khashoggi>_ who was assasinated in Saudi Arabia on the orders of the crown prince Mohammed bin Salman <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_bin_Salman>. Imagine if Ed Snowden <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Snowden> was beheaded in Times Square for exposing the spying activities of the US governement. These are some examples of the kind of danger that activists have to deal with living in authoritarian regimes.

The other compelling reason is that I saw that the original project was using VirtualBox which is highly insecure, the reasons for which are given in the next paragraph.

Why does this project use virt-manager over VirtualBox? ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ The Whonix developers themselves have strongly advised <https://www.whonix.org/wiki/KVM#Why_Use_KVM_Over_VirtualBox.3F>_ users not to use VirtualBox because lack of transparency and verifiability of the VirtualBox developer team mainly because of their decision to not go public on details of security bugs in their software , as well as discouraging full and public disclosure by third parties. This kind of laziness is particularly alarming when it comes to patching critical security vulnerabilities in software used by vulnerable people case in point a zero day vulnerability in their software reported privately to Oracle in October 2008. This security vulnerability remained unfixed for 4 years. This kind of indolent attitude has not been seen from any other company.

People might think that this might be because of bad managment in the past but that isn't the case. On the VirtualBox bugtracker, ticket VirtualBox 5.2.18 is vulnerable to spectre/meltdown despite microcode being installed indicating non-responsiveness and non-progress by upstream. Meltdown <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meltdown_(security_vulnerability)>_ is a variant of `Spectre <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_