supply-chain-attack-response
Detect, respond to, and prevent software supply chain attacks on package registries, container images, and CI/CD pipelines with lockfile auditing, provenance verification, and emergency response playbooks.
Install / Use
npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill supply-chain-attack-responseInstalls into whichever agent you are using.
SKILL.md
Installable skill definition
Quality Score
Category
AutomationSupported Platforms
Our assessment of supply-chain-attack-response
supply-chain-attack-response scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 1560th of 2,790 Automation skills we index.
Its SKILL.md is 23 KB long, well organised into 139 sections with 39 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.
With 1,113 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.
Maintenance, license and trust
- The repository was last updated about 6 months ago. That is recent enough to be usable, but agent tooling moves fast, so check the instructions against your agent's current version.
- Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
- It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
- Its trust signals score 98/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.
Safety scan
No issues foundOur scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.
AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-07. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-07. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.
supply-chain-attack-response compared with similar skills
All 4 of these similar skills score higher than supply-chain-attack-response; compare them before choosing.
| Skill | Score | Stars | Updated | Format |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| supply-chain-attack-response (this skill)by BagelHole | 88 | 1.1k | 6mo ago | SKILL.md |
| taste-skillby Leonxlnx | 100 | 116.8k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| Agent-Reachby Panniantong | 100 | 112.3k | 8d ago | CLAUDE.md |
| rufloby ruvnet | 100 | 81.9k | today | CLAUDE.md |
| Claude-Code-Game-Studiosby Donchitos | 100 | 39.7k | 7d ago | CLAUDE.md |
Frequently asked questions
- How do I install supply-chain-attack-response?
- Run
npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill supply-chain-attack-response. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent. - Which AI agents does supply-chain-attack-response work with?
- It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
- Is supply-chain-attack-response safe to use?
- Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 98/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
- Is supply-chain-attack-response still maintained?
- The repository was last updated about 6 months ago. That is recent enough to be usable, but agent tooling moves fast, so check the instructions against your agent's current version.
Skill content
View source on GitHubname: supply-chain-attack-response description: Detect, respond to, and prevent software supply chain attacks on package registries, container images, and CI/CD pipelines with lockfile auditing, provenance verification, and emergency response playbooks. license: MIT metadata: author: devops-skills version: "1.0"
Supply Chain Attack Response
Software supply chain attacks target the dependencies, build systems, and distribution channels that developers trust implicitly. When a package on PyPI, npm, or crates.io is compromised, every downstream consumer inherits the malicious payload. This skill provides detection techniques, emergency response playbooks, and hardening strategies to protect your software supply chain end to end.
1. When to Use This Skill
Invoke this skill when any of the following apply:
- A dependency you consume has been flagged as compromised (e.g., advisories on OSV.dev, GitHub Advisory Database, or vendor disclosure).
- You observe suspicious behavior from a dependency: unexpected network calls, file system writes outside its scope, or new post-install scripts.
- You are conducting a periodic supply chain security audit.
- A CI/CD pipeline is behaving unexpectedly after a dependency update.
- You are onboarding a new third-party dependency and want to verify its provenance.
- You need to respond to an incident such as a typosquatted package or registry account takeover.
- You are implementing SLSA compliance or need to generate build provenance.
2. Detection
2.1 npm Audit
# Full audit of installed packages
npm audit
# JSON output for programmatic processing
npm audit --json | jq '.vulnerabilities | to_entries[] | select(.value.severity == "critical")'
# Fix automatically where possible
npm audit fix
# Check for known malicious packages via Socket.dev CLI
npx socket scan --package-lock package-lock.json
2.2 pip Audit
# Install pip-audit (maintained by Google/OSSF)
pip install pip-audit
# Audit current environment against OSV.dev
pip-audit
# Audit a requirements file directly
pip-audit -r requirements.txt --output json
# Check for typosquatting with bandersnatch or custom script
pip-audit --strict --desc on
2.3 Cargo Audit
# Install cargo-audit
cargo install cargo-audit
# Run audit against RustSec Advisory Database
cargo audit
# JSON output for CI integration
cargo audit --json
# Check for yanked crates
cargo audit --deny yanked
2.4 Sigstore / Cosign Verification
# Verify a container image signature with cosign
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity "https://github.com/myorg/myrepo/.github/workflows/build.yml@refs/heads/main" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
# Verify an artifact with sigstore-python
pip install sigstore
python -m sigstore verify identity \
--cert-identity "release@example.com" \
--cert-oidc-issuer "https://accounts.google.com" \
artifact.tar.gz
2.5 SLSA Provenance Checks
# Install slsa-verifier
go install github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/v2/cli/slsa-verifier@latest
# Verify provenance of a binary
slsa-verifier verify-artifact my-binary \
--provenance-path my-binary.intoto.jsonl \
--source-uri github.com/myorg/myrepo \
--source-tag v1.2.3
3. Emergency Response Playbook
When a dependency is confirmed compromised, execute these steps in order.
Step 1: Contain -- Pin and Freeze
# Pin the last known-good version immediately in package.json
npm install <package>@<safe-version> --save-exact
# For pip, pin with hash verification
pip download <package>==<safe-version> --require-hashes -d ./vendor/
# For cargo, pin in Cargo.toml
# Replace: some_crate = "^1.2" with:
# some_crate = "=1.2.3"
cargo update -p some_crate --precise 1.2.3
Step 2: Audit Exposure
# Determine which versions you pulled and when
# npm
npm ls <compromised-package>
cat package-lock.json | jq '.packages | to_entries[] | select(.key | contains("<compromised-package>"))'
# pip
pip show <compromised-package>
pip cache list <compromised-package>
# Check git history for when the dependency version changed
git log --all -p -- package-lock.json | grep -A2 -B2 "<compromised-package>"
Step 3: Scan for Indicators of Compromise
# Search for known IOCs from the advisory
grep -r "suspicious-domain.com" ./node_modules/<compromised-package>/
grep -r "eval(atob" ./node_modules/<compromised-package>/
# Check for unexpected post-install scripts
cat node_modules/<compromised-package>/package.json | jq '.scripts'
# For Python packages, inspect setup.py and __init__.py
find ~/.local/lib/python*/site-packages/<compromised-package>/ -name "*.py" \
| xargs grep -l "subprocess\|os.system\|exec(\|eval("
Step 4: Notify Stakeholders
SUBJECT: [SECURITY INCIDENT] Compromised dependency: <package-name>
SEVERITY: Critical
IMPACT: <package-name> versions <affected-range> contain malicious code.
AFFECTED SYSTEMS: <list of repos/services consuming this dependency>
STATUS: Contained -- pinned to safe version <safe-version>
ACTIONS TAKEN:
1. Pinned all repositories to last known-good version
2. Initiated audit of all systems that pulled affected versions
3. Scanning for indicators of compromise
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS:
- Do NOT deploy any build that consumed affected versions
- Review CI/CD logs for the timeframe <start> to <end>
- Rotate any secrets that were accessible to the build environment
Step 5: Replace or Fork
# If the package maintainer account was compromised, fork the last safe version
git clone https://github.com/original-author/<package>.git
cd <package>
git checkout v<safe-version>
# Publish to your private registry or vendor directly
# For npm, point to your fork via package.json
# "dependencies": { "<package>": "git+https://github.com/yourorg/<package>.git#v1.2.3" }
4. Lockfile Auditing
Lockfiles are your first line of defense. Tampered or inconsistent lockfiles indicate something is wrong.
4.1 Verify Lockfile Integrity
# npm: ensure lockfile matches package.json (fails CI if out of sync)
npm ci
# Yarn: check lockfile integrity
yarn install --frozen-lockfile
# pip: generate a hash-locked requirements file
pip-compile --generate-hashes requirements.in -o requirements.txt
# Verify no unexpected changes in lockfile during PR
git diff --name-only origin/main...HEAD | grep -E "(package-lock|yarn.lock|Cargo.lock|requirements.txt)"
4.2 Detect Typosquatting
# Use the socket CLI to check for typosquatting risk
npx socket scan --package-lock package-lock.json
# Python: check package names against popular packages
pip-audit -r requirements.txt 2>&1 | grep -i "typosquat"
# Custom check: compare package names to known popular packages
# Flag anything with edit distance <= 2 from a top-1000 package
python3 -c "
import json, sys
from difflib import SequenceMatcher
with open('package-lock.json') as f:
lock = json.load(f)
popular = ['express','lodash','react','axios','chalk','debug','commander','inquirer']
for pkg in lock.get('packages', {}):
name = pkg.split('node_modules/')[-1] if 'node_modules/' in pkg else pkg
for p in popular:
ratio = SequenceMatcher(None, name, p).ratio()
if 0.75 < ratio < 1.0 and name != p:
print(f'WARNING: {name} is suspiciously similar to {p} (similarity: {ratio:.2f})')
"
4.3 Lockfile Diff in CI
# .github/workflows/lockfile-check.yml
name: Lockfile Audit
on: pull_request
jobs:
audit:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Check for lockfile changes
run: |
LOCKFILES="package-lock.json yarn.lock pnpm-lock.yaml Cargo.lock requirements.txt poetry.lock"
for f in $LOCKFILES; do
if git diff --name-only origin/main...HEAD | grep -q "$f"; then
echo "::warning::Lockfile $f was modified -- review dependency changes carefully"
git diff origin/main...HEAD -- "$f" | head -100
fi
done
- name: Run npm audit
if: hashFiles('package-lock.json') != ''
run: npm audit --audit-level=high
5. Package Pinning and Verification
5.1 pip Hash Checking
# requirements.txt with hashes (generated by pip-compile --generate-hashes)
requests==2.31.0 \
--hash=sha256:58cd2187c01e70e6e26505bca751777aa9f2ee0b7f4300988b709f44e013003eb \
--hash=sha256:942c5a758f98d790eaed1a29cb6eefc7f0edf3fcb0fce8afe0f44546e1
# Install with mandatory hash verification
pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
# Generate hashes for existing requirements
pip-compile --generate-hashes requirements.in
5.2 npm Package Integrity
# npm automatically verifies integrity hashes in package-lock.json
# Ensure your lockfile contains integrity fields:
cat package-lock.json | jq '.packages | to_entries[] | select(.value.integrity == null) | .key'
# Enable strict engine and audit checks in .npmrc
cat >> .npmrc << 'EOF'
engine-strict=true
audit=true
audit-level=high
EOF
5.3 cargo-vet for Rust
# Install cargo-vet
cargo install cargo-vet
# Initialize in your project
cargo vet init
# Certify a crate after review
cargo vet certify serde 1.0.193
# Import audit results from trusted organizations
cargo vet trust --all mozilla
cargo vet trust --all google
# Run verification in CI
cargo vet check
6. Container Image Verification
6.1 Cosign Sign and Verify
# Sign an image (keyless via Sigstore/Fulcio in CI)
cosign sign ghcr.io/myorg/myimage@sha256:abc123...
# Verify with expected identity
cosign verify \
--certificate-identity-regexp "https://github.com/myorg/.*" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest
# Verify and extract attestations
cosign verify-attestation \
--type slsaprovenance \
--certificate-identity-regexp "https://github.com/myorg/.*" \
--certificate-oidc-issuer "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com" \
ghcr.io/myorg/myimage:latest | jq '.payload' | base64 -d | jq .
6.2 Kyverno Policy -- Require Signed Images
# kyverno-require-signed-images.yaml
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: require-signed-images
spec:
validationFailureAction: Enforce
background: false
rules:
- name: verify-image-signature
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
verifyImages:
- imageReferences:
- "ghcr.io/myorg/*"
attestors:
- entries:
- keyless:
subject: "https://github.com/myorg/*"
issuer: "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
rekor:
url: https://rekor.sigstore.dev
# Apply the policy
kubectl apply -f kyverno-require-signed-images.yaml
# Test: this unsigned image should be rejected
kubectl run test --image=ghcr.io/myorg/unsigned-image:latest
# Expected: admission webhook denies the request
7. CI/CD Pipeline Hardening
7.1 Pin GitHub Actions by SHA
# BAD: mutable tag, can be hijacked
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
# GOOD: pinned to exact commit SHA
- uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4.1.1
# Use pin-github-action to automate pinning
npm install -g pin-github-action
pin-github-action .github/workflows/*.yml
7.2 Isolated Runners
# Use ephemeral self-hosted runners that are destroyed after each job
jobs:
build:
runs-on: self-hosted
container:
image: ghcr.io/myorg/build-env:latest@sha256:abc123...
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11
Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.
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Languages
Trust signals
From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.
