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model-supply-chain-security

Secure the AI model supply chain with artifact signing, provenance attestation, SBOM workflows, dependency controls, and trusted model promotion.

Install / Use

npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill model-supply-chain-security

Installs into whichever agent you are using.

About this skill
📄

SKILL.md

Installable skill definition

Quality Score

88/100

Category

Security

Supported Platforms

Universal

Our assessment of model-supply-chain-security

model-supply-chain-security scores 88/100 on our quality scale, 625th of 1,108 Security skills we index.

Its SKILL.md is 12 KB long, well organised into 36 sections with 10 code examples: a thorough specification that gives an agent plenty to work with.

With 1,113 GitHub stars, it is one of the more widely adopted skills in the catalogue.

Substance
30/30
Structure
20/20
Description
15/15
Adoption
13/20
Freshness
11/15

Maintenance, license and trust

  • The repository was last updated about 6 months ago. That is recent enough to be usable, but agent tooling moves fast, so check the instructions against your agent's current version.
  • Our last check on 2026-11-01 found the source still online.
  • It is released under the MIT license, a permissive license that allows use, modification and commercial use with attribution.
  • Its trust signals score 98/100, with no cautions. These come from repository metadata, not a code audit — read the skill file before letting an agent act on it.

Safety scan

No issues found

Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful.

AI review by kimi-k2.7-code on 2026-10-07. Automated pattern scan on 2026-10-07. It catches known dangerous patterns, not every risk — read a skill before letting an agent act on it.

model-supply-chain-security compared with similar skills

All 4 of these similar skills score higher than model-supply-chain-security; compare them before choosing.

SkillScoreStarsUpdatedFormat
model-supply-chain-security (this skill)by BagelHole881.1k6mo agoSKILL.md
x402by browser-use100121.0k3d agoSKILL.md
algorithmic-artby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
pptxby anthropics100177.9k55d agoSKILL.md
designby nextlevelbuilder100149.0k6d agoSKILL.md

Frequently asked questions

How do I install model-supply-chain-security?
Run npx skills add BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills --skill model-supply-chain-security. The install tabs above show the steps for each supported agent.
Which AI agents does model-supply-chain-security work with?
It is written for Universal, as a SKILL.md file. Other agents that read the same format can often use it too.
Is model-supply-chain-security safe to use?
Our scan of the whole file found no instruction hijacking, hidden characters, credential access, data exfiltration or destructive commands. An AI review of the same text found nothing harmful. It is MIT-licensed and scores 98/100 on trust signals. Skills are instructions an agent will follow, so read the file before installing it and do not approve commands you do not understand.
Is model-supply-chain-security still maintained?
The repository was last updated about 6 months ago. That is recent enough to be usable, but agent tooling moves fast, so check the instructions against your agent's current version.

name: model-supply-chain-security description: Secure the AI model supply chain with artifact signing, provenance attestation, SBOM workflows, dependency controls, and trusted model promotion. license: MIT metadata: author: devops-skills version: "1.0"

Model Supply Chain Security

Protect models and inference components from tampering, dependency compromise, and untrusted artifact promotion.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

  • Pulling pretrained models from public registries (Hugging Face, TensorFlow Hub)
  • Building model-serving containers for production deployment
  • Establishing trust policies for ML artifact promotion across environments
  • Responding to supply chain incidents affecting ML dependencies
  • Meeting SLSA or SOC2 compliance requirements for AI systems

Prerequisites

  • cosign v2+ installed for signing and verification
  • syft for SBOM generation of model-serving images
  • crane or skopeo for OCI image inspection
  • Container registry with signature support (GHCR, ECR, ACR, Artifact Registry)
  • CI/CD pipeline with provenance generation capability

Threats

  • Poisoned pretrained weights or adapters
  • Malicious model conversion tools or loaders
  • Compromised build pipelines and registries
  • Insecure runtime images with critical CVEs
  • Typosquatting on model registries
  • Deserialization attacks via pickle or custom loaders

Control Objectives

  • Verify artifact integrity end-to-end
  • Prove provenance for every promoted model
  • Detect vulnerable dependencies before deploy
  • Restrict execution to trusted signed artifacts

Model Signing with Cosign

Sign a Model Artifact

# Generate a keypair (store private key securely)
cosign generate-key-pair

# Sign an OCI-packaged model image
cosign sign --key cosign.key ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0

# Keyless signing with Sigstore (uses OIDC identity)
cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0

# Verify the signature
cosign verify --key cosign.pub ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0

# Keyless verification (requires certificate identity)
cosign verify \
  --certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com \
  ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0

Sign Model Weight Files Directly

# For model files stored as blobs (not OCI images)
# Compute digest and sign
sha256sum model-weights.safetensors > model-weights.sha256
cosign sign-blob --key cosign.key model-weights.safetensors \
  --output-signature model-weights.sig \
  --output-certificate model-weights.crt

# Verify blob signature
cosign verify-blob --key cosign.pub \
  --signature model-weights.sig \
  model-weights.safetensors

SLSA for ML Pipelines

SLSA Level Requirements for Model Builds

# slsa-requirements.yaml
slsa_levels:
  level_1:
    - Build process is scripted (not manual)
    - Provenance document generated automatically
  level_2:
    - Build runs on hosted CI service
    - Provenance is authenticated (signed)
    - Source is version controlled
  level_3:
    - Build environment is ephemeral and isolated
    - Provenance is non-falsifiable (hardened builder)
    - Source integrity verified (two-person review)

Generate SLSA Provenance for Model Training

# .github/workflows/model-build-slsa.yml
name: Model Build with SLSA Provenance
on:
  push:
    tags: ['model-v*']

jobs:
  train-and-package:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      id-token: write
      contents: read
      packages: write
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4

      - name: Train model
        run: python train.py --config configs/production.yaml

      - name: Package model as OCI artifact
        run: |
          oras push ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }} \
            model-weights.safetensors:application/vnd.acme.model.safetensors \
            model-config.json:application/json

      - name: Generate SBOM for training environment
        run: |
          syft dir:. -o cyclonedx-json > training-sbom.json

      - name: Sign and attest
        run: |
          cosign sign ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }}
          cosign attest --predicate training-sbom.json \
            --type cyclonedx \
            ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:${{ github.ref_name }}

      - name: Generate provenance
        uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_container_slsa3.yml@v2.0.0
        with:
          image: ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment
          digest: ${{ steps.push.outputs.digest }}

Model Cards for Provenance

# model-card.yaml
model_details:
  name: "sentiment-classifier-v2.1.0"
  version: "2.1.0"
  type: "text-classification"
  framework: "pytorch"
  license: "Apache-2.0"

provenance:
  training_data:
    source: "s3://acme-datasets/sentiment-v3/"
    hash: "sha256:abc123..."
    data_card_ref: "https://internal.acme.com/data-cards/sentiment-v3"
  training_config:
    source: "git://github.com/acme/ml-models@abc123"
    hyperparameters:
      learning_rate: 0.00005
      epochs: 10
      batch_size: 32
  build_environment:
    builder: "github-actions"
    runner: "ubuntu-22.04"
    python: "3.11.7"
    torch: "2.1.2"
    cuda: "12.1"
  build_id: "gh-actions-12345"
  commit_sha: "abc123def456"
  build_timestamp: "2025-01-15T10:30:00Z"
  signed_by: "ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com"

performance:
  accuracy: 0.94
  f1_score: 0.93
  evaluation_dataset: "s3://acme-datasets/sentiment-eval-v3/"
  evaluation_hash: "sha256:def456..."

security:
  vulnerability_scan: "clean"
  sbom_ref: "ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment:v2.1.0.sbom"
  last_security_review: "2025-01-10"
  known_limitations:
    - "May produce biased outputs for underrepresented languages"
    - "Not evaluated for adversarial robustness"

Registry Scanning

# Scan model-serving image for CVEs
trivy image ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0

# Generate SBOM for the serving container
syft ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0 -o spdx-json > serving-sbom.json

# Scan SBOM for vulnerabilities
grype sbom:serving-sbom.json --fail-on critical

# Check for known-malicious model files (pickle scanning)
pip install fickling
fickling --check model.pkl

Automated Registry Scan Pipeline

# .github/workflows/registry-scan.yml
name: Nightly Registry Scan
on:
  schedule:
    - cron: '0 2 * * *'

jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    strategy:
      matrix:
        image:
          - ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:latest
          - ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/embedding-serving:latest
          - ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/rag-api:latest
    steps:
      - name: Scan image
        run: |
          trivy image --severity CRITICAL,HIGH \
            --exit-code 1 \
            --format json \
            --output scan-$(echo ${{ matrix.image }} | tr '/:' '-').json \
            ${{ matrix.image }}

      - name: Verify signatures are still valid
        run: |
          cosign verify \
            --certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com \
            --certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com \
            ${{ matrix.image }}

Promotion Policy Enforcement

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""model_promotion_gate.py - Verify model meets all promotion criteria."""

import subprocess
import json
import sys

def check_signature(image: str) -> bool:
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["cosign", "verify", "--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
         "--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    )
    return result.returncode == 0

def check_vulnerabilities(image: str) -> bool:
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["trivy", "image", "--severity", "CRITICAL", "--exit-code", "1",
         "--quiet", image],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    )
    return result.returncode == 0

def check_sbom_exists(image: str) -> bool:
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["cosign", "verify-attestation", "--type", "cyclonedx",
         "--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
         "--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    )
    return result.returncode == 0

def check_model_card(image: str) -> bool:
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["cosign", "verify-attestation", "--type", "custom",
         "--certificate-identity=ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
         "--certificate-oidc-issuer=https://accounts.google.com", image],
        capture_output=True, text=True,
    )
    return result.returncode == 0

def main():
    image = sys.argv[1]
    checks = {
        "signature_valid": check_signature(image),
        "no_critical_cves": check_vulnerabilities(image),
        "sbom_attached": check_sbom_exists(image),
        "model_card_present": check_model_card(image),
    }
    all_passed = all(checks.values())
    for name, passed in checks.items():
        status = "PASS" if passed else "FAIL"
        print(f"  [{status}] {name}")
    if not all_passed:
        print("Promotion BLOCKED: not all checks passed.")
        sys.exit(1)
    print("Promotion APPROVED: all checks passed.")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Runtime Hardening

  • Run inference containers as non-root.
  • Apply egress restrictions to prevent unauthorized downloads.
  • Mount model volumes read-only when possible.
  • Alert on unsigned artifact pull attempts.
  • Use safetensors format instead of pickle to prevent deserialization attacks.
# kubernetes deployment hardening
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: model-serving
spec:
  template:
    spec:
      securityContext:
        runAsNonRoot: true
        runAsUser: 1000
        fsGroup: 1000
      containers:
        - name: inference
          image: ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/sentiment-serving:v2.1.0
          securityContext:
            readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
            allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
            capabilities:
              drop: ["ALL"]
          volumeMounts:
            - name: model-weights
              mountPath: /models
              readOnly: true
          resources:
            limits:
              memory: "4Gi"
              nvidia.com/gpu: "1"
      volumes:
        - name: model-weights
          persistentVolumeClaim:
            claimName: model-weights-pvc
            readOnly: true

Kyverno Policy for Admission Control

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: require-signed-model-images
spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce
  rules:
    - name: verify-model-image-signature
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: ["Pod"]
              namespaces: ["ml-serving"]
      verifyImages:
        - imageReferences: ["ghcr.io/acme/ml-models/*"]
          attestors:
            - entries:
                - keyless:
                    subject: "ci-bot@acme.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
                    issuer: "https://accounts.google.com"

Troubleshooting

| Problem | Cause | Solution | |---------|-------|----------| | cosign verify fails with "no matching signatures" | Image was pushed without signing | Re-run the signing step; check CI pipeline logs | | Provenance attestation missing | SLSA generator not configured | Add slsa-github-generator to the build workflow | | Trivy reports CVEs in base image | Stale base image | Update FROM image in Dockerfile; rebuild and re-sign | | Pickle deserialization warning | Model saved in unsafe format | Convert to safetensors: model.save_pretrained(".", safe_serialization=True) | | Keyless verification fails | Wrong OIDC issuer or identity | Check --certificate-identity and --certificate-oidc-issuer flags | | Model card not found for artifact | Attestation not attache

Truncated for display — read the full file on GitHub.

Related Skills

View on GitHub
GitHub Stars1.1k
CategorySecurity
Updated5mo ago
Forks158

Languages

Shell

Trust signals

98/100

From repository metadata: license, adoption, age and documentation. Not a code audit — see the Safety scan above for what the skill file itself contains.

1 info
model-supply-chain-security — Universal Skill: Install & Safety Check | SkillAgent